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Liberation [1975], pp. 139, 142.)
Singer is not committed to the view
that, as Goodman puts it, "wrong has
been done because nature is not
allowed to run in its own course."
In fact, I believe Singer would firmly
(and rightly) reject such a view.
But Singer can speak better than I
about what he did or didn't mean.
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Replies
(Ref. ETHICS AND�
AND ANIMALS 1/2
Review by JOHNSON of THE CASE
OF THE ANIMALS VS. MAN BEFORE
THE KING OF THE JINN; ETHICS
AND ANIMALS 11/2
11/2� Reply by
GOODMAN)
In his reply to my review,
Professor Goodman asserts:"
• if
suffering is involved in frustration
of all desires, the fact that the
desires in question are unlearned is
irrelevant. The mention [by Peter
Singer in Animal Liberation] of the
innateness of desires seems to me to
appeal to another (albeit natural)
standard of value beyond the
pleasure/pain calculus, namely
naturalness."
Is this a correct interpreation
of Singer's argument? I believe not,
as I indicated in my review. Singer's
point is not that what is innate or
natural has value ipso facto. Rather,
the point of saying that the desires
frustrated are innate is to emphasize
that they do not have to be learned.
Singer is arguing against those who
have claimed that because the animal
has never known any other life, it
cannot be suffering. (See Animal

Professor Goodman also complains
about my omitting mention of "existen
tial claims to virtual subjecthood"
in a passage I quoted which expresses
one of his "central ideas." I omitted
it because it seemed to me inessential
and, frankly, because I had no idea
what it meant. I still don't.
Apparently, however, in foreshortening
for the sak~ of intelligibility I
inadvertently managed to suggest to
Goodman that his "foundation for
animal deserts is subjective rather
than ontological and recognizable
by (age old but here newly analyzed)
projective (and rhetorical) devices."
I didn't mean to suggest that.
Indeed, I don't understand that any
better than I do "existential claims
to virtual subjecthood."
It would be unreasonable, how
ever, to expect Goodman to explain
in the brief space of a reply what
is undoubtedly a difficult and
complex notion. He mentions that he
has discussed the idea in some of
his other works. I hope that he will
write back and give references. No
doubt other readers of this journal
would also be interested in learning
more about "virtual subjecthood as a
foundation for the recognition of
. . . a general theory of deserts."

Edward Johnson
University of New Orleans
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(Ref. ETHICS AND ANIMALS 1/2
Review by JOHNSON of THE CASE
OF THE ANIMALS VS. MAN BEFORE
THE KING OF THE JINN; ETHICS
AND ANIMALS 11/2 Reply by
GOODMAN)
In Ethics and Animals, Volume 2,
No.2, Lenn Goodman says that he
can find two arguments in my book
Animal Liberation where Edward Johnson
found only one. Johnson claimed that
my objection to factory farming was
simply based on the fact that it
causes animal suffering. Lenn Goodman
suggests that in addition to this
consideration, I also appeal to the
unnaturalness of the degree of
confinement. He therefore finds an
implication that "wrong has been done
because nature is not allowed to run
its own course." I am happy to be
able to clear up this disagreement.
Edward Johnson got it right. My
ethical argument is based entirely
on the degree of suffering involved
in factory farming. It may sometimes
be relevant to this suffering that
factory farming frustrates desires
which animals naturally have. The
fact that the desires are "natural"
or "unlearned" is relevant only in
so far as it indicates that even a
bird or an animal which has been
brought up in confined conditions
from birth will experience desires
that are frustrated in factory farms.
Birds and animals are usually well
adapted for the conditions in which
they naturally live. Conditions
which are quite unnatural are there
fore likely to frustrate their innate
desires and to cause suffering.
On this basis I do not consider
unnaturalness to be intrinsically
wrong. To take this position would
be contrary to views that I hold in
other areas of ethics where I think
that it is irrelevant to object to
contraception, for example, that it is
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an unnatural interference with human
reproduction.

Peter Singer
Monash University
Australia

(MORE OF THE SAME)
Professor Harlan B. Miller
Department of Philosophy & Religion
Virginia Polytechnic Institute
Blacksburg, Va. 24061
Dear Dr. Miller:
In a letter to me of August 12th,
apparently written at the same
instance as his letter to you, Peter
Singer writes "I hope I had not misled
you with the expressions that you
have quoted. Animal Liberation was
not written exclusively or even
primarily for an audience of philoso
phers and for that reason I may
sometimes be guilty of writing in a
way that would have the greatest
possible impact on a general audience
rather than in a way that is
absolutely and literally accurate
from a philosophical point of view."
In view of this admission and the
passages quoted in my last letter, I
think the issue is rather clear.
Whether I "got it right" or "got it
wrong" does not quite strike the
right note. If Singer's rhetoric is
inconsistent with what he takes to be
his more rigorously held views, the
problem lies either in the rhetoric
or in the philosophy or in the
character who unites the two. My
task in my philosophical introduction
to The Case of the Animals vs. Man
was (in the passage that apparently
stopped Mr. Johnson) to tease out the
assumptions employed in appeals for
animal rights, not to attempt to
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harmonize the premises of those appeals
with other views of those who make
them. I agree with Singer that there
are problems with trying to render
the idea of non-interference with
nature categorical and respect his
reluctance to make that attempt. I
allude to some of those problems
under the rubric of the word 'romatic.'
But Singer's rhetoric does employ the
notion of non-disturbance of nature
and elicits part of its response on
the basis of an expectation that the
idea of naturalness will evoke some
sentiments of protectiveness of the
natural on the part of the reader.
.If Mr. Singer wishes to disown the
sentiments to which he appeals,
candor would require him to do so
publicly. After all, it was the
dialectical employment of premises
they did not themselves hold that
gave a bad name to many of Socrates'
most intellectually challenging
contemporaries.
Sincerely,*

L. E. Goodman, D.Phil.
Professor of Philosophy
*i.e. in hopes that my rhetoric
comports well with my sense.
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